

# A Simple Power Analysis Attack on the TwoFish Key Schedule

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# Introduction

Cryptography allows us to securely communicate information with other parties.



Credit: Randall Munroe https://xkcd.com/538/

Cryptography involves using protocols that ensure data confidentiality, data integrity and authentication.

## **Encryption Systems**

Cryptographic Algorithms are designed using **mathematical** constructs and are **publicly** available. Security relies on keys, secret pieces of information that dictate the output of the algorithm

### Types of encryption

- Symmetric Key Shared secret key between agents
- · Asymmetric Key Public and Private Key.



## Side Channel Attacks

A side-channel attack is any attack based on information gained from the **physical implementation** of a cryptosystem.



#### What percent of computing devices are embedded?

- A. 14%
- B. 56%
- C. 87%
- D. 98%

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## **Embedded Devices II**

#### As of 2015

- 98% percent of computing devices are embedded<sup>1</sup>
- 15 billion connected devices in 2015<sup>2</sup>

In 2020 There will be over **30 billion** connected devices<sup>3</sup>



G. Borriello and R. Want. Embedded Computation meets the World Wide Web. Commum. ACM

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> John Gantz. The Embedded Internet: Methodology and Findings

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Gartner Says Personal Worlds and the Internet of Everything Are Colliding to Create New Markets

#### **Differential Power Attacks**

Black Box Statistical Analysis from large sample of power traces



Credit: Frank Kagan: Side Channel Attack Secure Cryptographic Accelerators

#### Simple Power Attacks

Focuses on particular vulnerabilities of the algorithm that could leak information from the message or the key.



Figure 1: Hamming weight power trace leakage

## AES Contest I

But where did all these cryptographic protocols come from?

- DES Designed by IBM and approved by NSA. Standard for 20 years (1977-1997)
- AES Chosen by selection process over numerous contestants.



Credit: A Stick Figure Guide to the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

**Rijndael** was chosen as AES. Contestants were evaluated in several metrics. including hardware performance and smart card performance



Credit: A Stick Figure Guide to the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

#### Known Simple Power Attacks for AES contest finalists

- 1. Rijndael<sup>4</sup> (AES)
- 2. Serpent<sup>5</sup>
- 3. Twofish
- 4. Mars
- 5. RC6

Known attacks describe how to recover the **secret key** from a single power reading.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Joel VanLaven, Mark Brehob, and Kevin J. Compton. A computationally feasible SPA attack on AES via optimized search

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Kevin J. Compton, Brian Timm, and Joel VanLaven. A simple power analysis attack on the serpent key schedule

# Attack Description

## Encryption



TwoFish can use 128,192 or 256-bit keys. Encryption is performed via 16 feistel rounds and requires the generation of 40 subkeys.

## **Key Schedule**

Keys are generated in even and odd pairs. Each byte of the secret key is used 20 times.



## Attack Description I

We want to infer the key from the power reading. Each row is independent, and we know the values of *w* and the hamming weights of *v*.



There are 20 values for *i*, so we can solve for the bytes of the key *m*. We solve one round at a time from left to right.

## Attack Description II

For each byte  $m_l$  we have a 20 restrictions. We can do a *first meets* all search through the  $2^8 = 256$  possible bytes.

$$\begin{aligned} & H [v_{0,j,(k-1)}] = d_{0,j,k,0} \oplus x_{l,0} + d_{0,j,k,1} \oplus x_{l,1} + \ldots + d_{0,j,k,7} \oplus x_{l,7} \\ & H [v_{2,j,(k-1)}] = d_{2,j,k,0} \oplus x_{l,0} + d_{2,j,k,1} \oplus x_{l,1} + \ldots + d_{2,j,k,7} \oplus x_{l,7} \\ & H [v_{4,j,(k-1)}] = d_{4,j,k,0} \oplus x_{l,0} + d_{4,j,k,1} \oplus x_{l,1} + \ldots + d_{4,j,k,7} \oplus x_{l,7} \\ & \ldots \\ & H [v_{38,j,(k-1)}] = d_{38,j,k,0} \oplus x_{l,0} + d_{38,j,k,1} \oplus x_{l,1} + \ldots + d_{38,j,R,7} \oplus x_{l,7} \end{aligned}$$

Key Size	Accuracy	Avg. Runtime
128	100%	3.75 ms
192	100%	5.7 ms
256	100%	7.39 ms

## Presence of Noise

The attack so far is not perfect since it does not account for noise.

Power Traces have a non-negligible amount of noise superimposed. If the equipment is correctly tuned, noise will be gaussian and have zero mean.



#### Let's try again

Due to the noise the system of equations may not have a solution. Using the hamming weights of *w* we can transform the XORs to linear restrictions.



In order to solve the system we can use Least Minimum Squares. Finally, map the values to {0,1} by comparing to 0.5.

$$\begin{aligned} H_{\epsilon}^{*}(\mathsf{V}_{0,j,(k-1)}) - H[\mathsf{W}_{0,j,k}] &= a_{0,j,k,0} \cdot \mathsf{X}_{l,0} + a_{0,j,k,1} \cdot \mathsf{X}_{l,1} + \ldots + a_{0,j,k,7} \cdot \mathsf{X}_{l,7} \\ H_{\epsilon}^{*}(\mathsf{V}_{2,j,(k-1)}) - H[\mathsf{W}_{2,j,k}] &= a_{2,j,k,0} \cdot \mathsf{X}_{l,0} + a_{2,j,k,1} \cdot \mathsf{X}_{l,1} + \ldots + a_{2,j,k,7} \cdot \mathsf{X}_{l,7} \\ H_{\epsilon}^{*}(\mathsf{V}_{4,j,(k-1)}) - H[\mathsf{W}_{4,j,k}] &= a_{4,j,k,0} \cdot \mathsf{X}_{l,0} + a_{4,j,k,1} \cdot \mathsf{X}_{l,1} + \ldots + a_{4,j,k,7} \cdot \mathsf{X}_{l,7} \\ & \dots \end{aligned}$$

 $\int \mathrm{H}_{\epsilon}^{*} (\mathsf{v}_{38,j,(k-1)}) - \mathrm{H} \big[ \mathsf{w}_{38,j,k} \big] = a_{38,j,k,0} \cdot \mathsf{x}_{l,0} + a_{38,j,k,1} \cdot \mathsf{x}_{l,1} + \ldots + a_{38,j,R,7} \cdot \mathsf{x}_{l,7}$ 

#### Can we do better?

Mistakes are being made when estimating single bytes. Mistakes are propagated to the following rounds.

Not all mistakes are equally likely, we are most probably estimating incorrectly, one or two bits. We can flip individual bits and **minimize the error** to the hamming weights.

> ... 111111111

Round to nearest integer the whole power trace

For each byte  $m_l$  of the key

- A. Solve equations with Least Mean Squares
- B. Map real valued solutions  $\mathbb{R} \to \{0,1\}$  to get  $\hat{m}_l$
- C. Find the mask  $h_M = 0...255$  that minimizes the hamming distance to the measurements of inputs and outputs of the S-boxes.  $\hat{m}_l^* = \hat{m}_l \oplus h_M$

## Simulation & Results

## Results

Applying noise correction techniques we can recover the key 99% of the time with  $\sigma <$  1.0.

For each  $\sigma_{\!\!\!\!}$  mask size and key size combination 1000 simulations were run.



#### Accuracies 128-bit key

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This attack can be performed in any implementation of **TwoFish** due to the byte nature of the S-boxes.

- Embedded Systems are increasing by number everyday and carry large amounts of personal private information.
- Current cryptographic protocols do not have secure implementations for most embedded devices.
- TwoFish has a **noise resistant** simple power attack for all of its implementations (8, 32, 64-bit **C** and **ASM**.)

#### **Further Work**

- Are Mars and RC6 secure against SPA?
- Need to devise new algorithms or implementations of current algorithms that are not susceptible to SPA

# Thank you!

